Import Debian changes 2.3.4-5+deb8u2debian/2.3.4-5+deb8u2

openvpn (2.3.4-5+deb8u2) jessie-security; urgency=high

  * SECURITY UPDATE: authenticated remote DoS vulnerability due to
    packet ID rollover. CVE-2017-7479.
    Kudos to Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com> for doing all the backporting
    work for this patch.
    - debian/patches/CVE-2017-7479-prereq.patch: merge
      packet_id_alloc_outgoing() into packet_id_write()
    - debian/patches/CVE-2017-7479.patch: do not assert when packet ID
      rollover occurs
  * SECURITY UPDATE: (Closes: #865480)
    - CVE-2017-7508.patch. Fix remotely-triggerable ASSERT() on malformed IPv6
      packet.
    - CVE-2017-7520.patch. Prevent two kinds of stack buffer OOB reads and a
      crash for invalid input data.
    - CVE-2017-7521.patch. Fix potential double-free in --x509-alt-username.
    - CVE-2017-7521bis.patch. Fix remote-triggerable memory leaks.

1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-7521bis.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-7521bis.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a986ef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-7521bis.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+commit 84e1775961de1c9d2ab32159fc03f758591f5238
+Author: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
+Date:   Mon Jun 19 11:28:38 2017 +0200
+
+    Fix remote-triggerable memory leaks (CVE-2017-7521)
+    
+    Several of our OpenSSL-specific certificate-parsing code paths did not
+    always clear all allocated memory.  Since a client can cause a few bytes
+    of memory to be leaked for each connection attempt, a client can cause a
+    server to run out of memory and thereby kill the server.  That makes this
+    a (quite inefficient) DoS attack.
+    
+    When using the --x509-alt-username option on openssl builds with an
+    extension (argument prefixed with "ext:", e.g. "ext:subjectAltName"), the
+    code would not free all allocated memory.  Fix this by using the proper
+    free function.
+    
+    If ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() returns 0, it didn't fail and *did* allocate
+    memory.  So also free the returned buffer if it returns 0.
+    
+    These issues were found, analysed and reported to the OpenVPN team by Guido
+    Vranken.
+    
+    CVE: 2017-7521
+    Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
+    Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
+    Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
+    Acked-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
+    Message-Id: <1497864520-12219-4-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
+    URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=1497864520-12219-4-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com
+    Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
+    (cherry picked from commit 2d032c7fcdfd692c851ea2fa858b4c2d9ea7d52d)
+
+Index: openvpn-2.3.4/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
+===================================================================
+--- openvpn-2.3.4.orig/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
++++ openvpn-2.3.4/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ bool extract_x509_extension(X509 *cert,
+                 break;
+             }
+           }
+-        sk_GENERAL_NAME_free (extensions);
++        GENERAL_NAMES_free(extensions);
+     }
+   return retval;
+ }
+@@ -191,8 +191,7 @@ extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_NAME *x509,
+   asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(x509ne);
+   if (!asn1)
+     return FAILURE;
+-  tmp = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&buf, asn1);
+-  if (tmp <= 0)
++  if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&buf, asn1) < 0)
+     return FAILURE;
+ 
+   strncpynt(out, (char *)buf, size);
+@@ -364,7 +363,7 @@ x509_setenv_track (const struct x509_tra
+ 		  ASN1_STRING *val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (ent);
+ 		  unsigned char *buf;
+ 		  buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */
+-		  if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) > 0)
++		  if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) >= 0)
+ 		    {
+ 		      do_setenv_x509(es, xt->name, (char *)buf, depth);
+ 		      OPENSSL_free (buf);
+@@ -440,7 +439,7 @@ x509_setenv (struct env_set *es, int cer
+       if (!objbuf)
+ 	continue;
+       buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */
+-      if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) <= 0)
++      if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) < 0)
+ 	continue;
+       name_expand_size = 64 + strlen (objbuf);
+       name_expand = (char *) malloc (name_expand_size);