Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/2.5_beta1'

Update to upstream version '2.5~beta1'
with Debian dir d53f9a482ac24eb491a294b26c24bb1d87afad24

1 files changed, 478 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c b/src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c
index ecc654e..7b5016d 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c
@@ -29,12 +29,24 @@
 
 #include "syshead.h"
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO
+#include "argv.h"
+#include "base64.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+#include "run_command.h"
 #include "session_id.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
 
 #include "tls_crypt.h"
 
+const char *tls_crypt_v2_cli_pem_name = "OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 client key";
+const char *tls_crypt_v2_srv_pem_name = "OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 server key";
+
+/** Metadata contains user-specified data */
+static const uint8_t TLS_CRYPT_METADATA_TYPE_USER           = 0x00;
+/** Metadata contains a 64-bit unix timestamp in network byte order */
+static const uint8_t TLS_CRYPT_METADATA_TYPE_TIMESTAMP      = 0x01;
+
 static struct key_type
 tls_crypt_kt(void)
 {
@@ -67,14 +79,14 @@ tls_crypt_buf_overhead(void)
 
 void
 tls_crypt_init_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const char *key_file,
-                   const char *key_inline, bool tls_server)
+                   bool key_inline, bool tls_server)
 {
     const int key_direction = tls_server ?
                               KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL : KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE;
     struct key_type kt = tls_crypt_kt();
     if (!kt.cipher || !kt.digest)
     {
-        msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: --tls-crypt not supported");
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: --tls-crypt not supported");
     }
     crypto_read_openvpn_key(&kt, key, key_file, key_inline, key_direction,
                             "Control Channel Encryption", "tls-crypt");
@@ -266,4 +278,466 @@ error_exit:
     return false;
 }
 
-#endif /* EMABLE_CRYPTO */
+static inline void
+tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const struct key2 *key2,
+                             bool tls_server)
+{
+    const int key_direction = tls_server ?
+                              KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL : KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE;
+    struct key_type kt = tls_crypt_kt();
+    if (!kt.cipher || !kt.digest)
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: --tls-crypt-v2 not supported");
+    }
+    init_key_ctx_bi(key, key2, key_direction, &kt,
+                    "Control Channel Encryption");
+}
+
+void
+tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, struct buffer *wkc_buf,
+                             const char *key_file, bool key_inline)
+{
+    struct buffer client_key = alloc_buf(TLS_CRYPT_V2_CLIENT_KEY_LEN
+                                         + TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN);
+
+    if (!read_pem_key_file(&client_key, tls_crypt_v2_cli_pem_name,
+                           key_file, key_inline))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: invalid tls-crypt-v2 client key format");
+    }
+
+    struct key2 key2;
+    if (!buf_read(&client_key, &key2.keys, sizeof(key2.keys)))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: not enough data in tls-crypt-v2 client key");
+    }
+
+    tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(key, &key2, false);
+    secure_memzero(&key2, sizeof(key2));
+
+    *wkc_buf = client_key;
+}
+
+void
+tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,
+                             const char *key_file, bool key_inline)
+{
+    struct key srv_key;
+    struct buffer srv_key_buf;
+
+    buf_set_write(&srv_key_buf, (void *)&srv_key, sizeof(srv_key));
+    if (!read_pem_key_file(&srv_key_buf, tls_crypt_v2_srv_pem_name,
+                           key_file, key_inline))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: invalid tls-crypt-v2 server key format");
+    }
+
+    struct key_type kt = tls_crypt_kt();
+    if (!kt.cipher || !kt.digest)
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: --tls-crypt-v2 not supported");
+    }
+    init_key_ctx(key_ctx, &srv_key, &kt, encrypt, "tls-crypt-v2 server key");
+    secure_memzero(&srv_key, sizeof(srv_key));
+}
+
+static bool
+tls_crypt_v2_wrap_client_key(struct buffer *wkc,
+                             const struct key2 *src_key,
+                             const struct buffer *src_metadata,
+                             struct key_ctx *server_key, struct gc_arena *gc)
+{
+    cipher_ctx_t *cipher_ctx = server_key->cipher;
+    struct buffer work = alloc_buf_gc(TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN
+                                      + cipher_ctx_block_size(cipher_ctx), gc);
+
+    /* Calculate auth tag and synthetic IV */
+    uint8_t *tag = buf_write_alloc(&work, TLS_CRYPT_TAG_SIZE);
+    if (!tag)
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "ERROR: could not write tag");
+        return false;
+    }
+    uint16_t net_len = htons(sizeof(src_key->keys) + BLEN(src_metadata)
+                             + TLS_CRYPT_V2_TAG_SIZE + sizeof(uint16_t));
+    hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx = server_key->hmac;
+    hmac_ctx_reset(hmac_ctx);
+    hmac_ctx_update(hmac_ctx, (void *)&net_len, sizeof(net_len));
+    hmac_ctx_update(hmac_ctx, (void *)src_key->keys, sizeof(src_key->keys));
+    hmac_ctx_update(hmac_ctx, BPTR(src_metadata), BLEN(src_metadata));
+    hmac_ctx_final(hmac_ctx, tag);
+
+    dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "TLS-CRYPT WRAP TAG: %s",
+         format_hex(tag, TLS_CRYPT_TAG_SIZE, 0, gc));
+
+    /* Use the 128 most significant bits of the tag as IV */
+    ASSERT(cipher_ctx_reset(cipher_ctx, tag));
+
+    /* Overflow check (OpenSSL requires an extra block in the dst buffer) */
+    if (buf_forward_capacity(&work) < (sizeof(src_key->keys)
+                                       + BLEN(src_metadata)
+                                       + sizeof(net_len)
+                                       + cipher_ctx_block_size(cipher_ctx)))
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "ERROR: could not crypt: insufficient space in dst");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /* Encrypt */
+    int outlen = 0;
+    ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update(cipher_ctx, BEND(&work), &outlen,
+                             (void *)src_key->keys, sizeof(src_key->keys)));
+    ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
+    ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update(cipher_ctx, BEND(&work), &outlen,
+                             BPTR(src_metadata), BLEN(src_metadata)));
+    ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
+    ASSERT(cipher_ctx_final(cipher_ctx, BEND(&work), &outlen));
+    ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
+    ASSERT(buf_write(&work, &net_len, sizeof(net_len)));
+
+    return buf_copy(wkc, &work);
+}
+
+static bool
+tls_crypt_v2_unwrap_client_key(struct key2 *client_key, struct buffer *metadata,
+                               struct buffer wrapped_client_key,
+                               struct key_ctx *server_key)
+{
+    const char *error_prefix = __func__;
+    bool ret = false;
+    struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+    /* The crypto API requires one extra cipher block of buffer head room when
+     * decrypting, which nicely matches the tag size of WKc.  So
+     * TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN is always large enough for the plaintext. */
+    uint8_t plaintext_buf_data[TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN] = { 0 };
+    struct buffer plaintext = { 0 };
+
+    dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG_MED, "%s: unwrapping client key (len=%d): %s", __func__,
+         BLEN(&wrapped_client_key), format_hex(BPTR(&wrapped_client_key),
+                                               BLEN(&wrapped_client_key),
+                                               0, &gc));
+
+    if (TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN < BLEN(&wrapped_client_key))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("wrapped client key too big");
+    }
+
+    /* Decrypt client key and metadata */
+    uint16_t net_len = 0;
+    const uint8_t *tag = BPTR(&wrapped_client_key);
+
+    if (BLEN(&wrapped_client_key) < sizeof(net_len))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("failed to read length");
+    }
+    memcpy(&net_len, BEND(&wrapped_client_key) - sizeof(net_len),
+           sizeof(net_len));
+
+    if (ntohs(net_len) != BLEN(&wrapped_client_key))
+    {
+        dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "%s: net_len=%u, BLEN=%i", __func__,
+             ntohs(net_len), BLEN(&wrapped_client_key));
+        CRYPT_ERROR("invalid length");
+    }
+
+    buf_inc_len(&wrapped_client_key, -(int)sizeof(net_len));
+
+    if (!buf_advance(&wrapped_client_key, TLS_CRYPT_TAG_SIZE))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("failed to read tag");
+    }
+
+    if (!cipher_ctx_reset(server_key->cipher, tag))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("failed to initialize IV");
+    }
+    buf_set_write(&plaintext, plaintext_buf_data, sizeof(plaintext_buf_data));
+    int outlen = 0;
+    if (!cipher_ctx_update(server_key->cipher, BPTR(&plaintext), &outlen,
+                           BPTR(&wrapped_client_key),
+                           BLEN(&wrapped_client_key)))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("could not decrypt client key");
+    }
+    ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&plaintext, outlen));
+
+    if (!cipher_ctx_final(server_key->cipher, BEND(&plaintext), &outlen))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("cipher final failed");
+    }
+    ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&plaintext, outlen));
+
+    /* Check authentication */
+    uint8_t tag_check[TLS_CRYPT_TAG_SIZE] = { 0 };
+    hmac_ctx_reset(server_key->hmac);
+    hmac_ctx_update(server_key->hmac, (void *)&net_len, sizeof(net_len));
+    hmac_ctx_update(server_key->hmac, BPTR(&plaintext),
+                    BLEN(&plaintext));
+    hmac_ctx_final(server_key->hmac, tag_check);
+
+    if (memcmp_constant_time(tag, tag_check, sizeof(tag_check)))
+    {
+        dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "tag      : %s",
+             format_hex(tag, sizeof(tag_check), 0, &gc));
+        dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "tag_check: %s",
+             format_hex(tag_check, sizeof(tag_check), 0, &gc));
+        CRYPT_ERROR("client key authentication error");
+    }
+
+    if (buf_len(&plaintext) < sizeof(client_key->keys))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("failed to read client key");
+    }
+    memcpy(&client_key->keys, BPTR(&plaintext), sizeof(client_key->keys));
+    ASSERT(buf_advance(&plaintext, sizeof(client_key->keys)));
+
+    if (!buf_copy(metadata, &plaintext))
+    {
+        CRYPT_ERROR("metadata too large for supplied buffer");
+    }
+
+    ret = true;
+error_exit:
+    if (!ret)
+    {
+        secure_memzero(client_key, sizeof(*client_key));
+    }
+    buf_clear(&plaintext);
+    gc_free(&gc);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static bool
+tls_crypt_v2_verify_metadata(const struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx,
+                             const struct tls_options *opt)
+{
+    bool ret = false;
+    struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+    const char *tmp_file = NULL;
+    struct buffer metadata = ctx->tls_crypt_v2_metadata;
+    int metadata_type = buf_read_u8(&metadata);
+    if (metadata_type < 0)
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "ERROR: no metadata type");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    tmp_file = platform_create_temp_file(opt->tmp_dir, "tls_crypt_v2_metadata_",
+                                         &gc);
+    if (!tmp_file || !buffer_write_file(tmp_file, &metadata))
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "ERROR: could not write metadata to file");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    char metadata_type_str[4] = { 0 }; /* Max value: 255 */
+    openvpn_snprintf(metadata_type_str, sizeof(metadata_type_str),
+                     "%i", metadata_type);
+    struct env_set *es = env_set_create(NULL);
+    setenv_str(es, "script_type", "tls-crypt-v2-verify");
+    setenv_str(es, "metadata_type", metadata_type_str);
+    setenv_str(es, "metadata_file", tmp_file);
+
+    struct argv argv = argv_new();
+    argv_parse_cmd(&argv, opt->tls_crypt_v2_verify_script);
+    argv_msg_prefix(D_TLS_DEBUG, &argv, "Executing tls-crypt-v2-verify");
+
+    ret = openvpn_run_script(&argv, es, 0, "--tls-crypt-v2-verify");
+
+    argv_free(&argv);
+    env_set_destroy(es);
+
+    if (!platform_unlink(tmp_file))
+    {
+        msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: failed to remove temp file '%s", tmp_file);
+    }
+
+    if (ret)
+    {
+        msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS CRYPT V2 VERIFY SCRIPT OK");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS CRYPT V2 VERIFY SCRIPT ERROR");
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    gc_free(&gc);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+bool
+tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf,
+                                struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx,
+                                const struct tls_options *opt)
+{
+    if (!ctx->tls_crypt_v2_server_key.cipher)
+    {
+        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+            "Client wants tls-crypt-v2, but no server key present.");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "Control Channel: using tls-crypt-v2 key");
+
+    struct buffer wrapped_client_key = *buf;
+    uint16_t net_len = 0;
+
+    if (BLEN(&wrapped_client_key) < sizeof(net_len))
+    {
+        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "failed to read length");
+    }
+    memcpy(&net_len, BEND(&wrapped_client_key) - sizeof(net_len),
+           sizeof(net_len));
+
+    size_t wkc_len = ntohs(net_len);
+    if (!buf_advance(&wrapped_client_key, BLEN(&wrapped_client_key) - wkc_len))
+    {
+        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Can not locate tls-crypt-v2 client key");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    struct key2 client_key = { 0 };
+    ctx->tls_crypt_v2_metadata = alloc_buf(TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_METADATA_LEN);
+    if (!tls_crypt_v2_unwrap_client_key(&client_key,
+                                        &ctx->tls_crypt_v2_metadata,
+                                        wrapped_client_key,
+                                        &ctx->tls_crypt_v2_server_key))
+    {
+        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Can not unwrap tls-crypt-v2 client key");
+        secure_memzero(&client_key, sizeof(client_key));
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /* Load the decrypted key */
+    ctx->mode = TLS_WRAP_CRYPT;
+    ctx->cleanup_key_ctx = true;
+    ctx->opt.flags |= CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM;
+    memset(&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi, 0, sizeof(ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi));
+    tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi, &client_key, true);
+    secure_memzero(&client_key, sizeof(client_key));
+
+    /* Remove client key from buffer so tls-crypt code can unwrap message */
+    ASSERT(buf_inc_len(buf, -(BLEN(&wrapped_client_key))));
+
+    if (opt && opt->tls_crypt_v2_verify_script)
+    {
+        return tls_crypt_v2_verify_metadata(ctx, opt);
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+void
+tls_crypt_v2_write_server_key_file(const char *filename)
+{
+    write_pem_key_file(filename, tls_crypt_v2_srv_pem_name);
+}
+
+void
+tls_crypt_v2_write_client_key_file(const char *filename,
+                                   const char *b64_metadata,
+                                   const char *server_key_file,
+                                   bool server_key_inline)
+{
+    struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+    struct key_ctx server_key = { 0 };
+    struct buffer client_key_pem = { 0 };
+    struct buffer dst = alloc_buf_gc(TLS_CRYPT_V2_CLIENT_KEY_LEN
+                                     + TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN, &gc);
+    struct key2 client_key = { 2 };
+
+    if (!rand_bytes((void *)client_key.keys, sizeof(client_key.keys)))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not generate random key");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    ASSERT(buf_write(&dst, client_key.keys, sizeof(client_key.keys)));
+
+    struct buffer metadata = alloc_buf_gc(TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_METADATA_LEN, &gc);
+    if (b64_metadata)
+    {
+        if (TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_B64_METADATA_LEN < strlen(b64_metadata))
+        {
+            msg(M_FATAL,
+                "ERROR: metadata too long (%d bytes, max %u bytes)",
+                (int)strlen(b64_metadata), TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_B64_METADATA_LEN);
+        }
+        ASSERT(buf_write(&metadata, &TLS_CRYPT_METADATA_TYPE_USER, 1));
+        int decoded_len = openvpn_base64_decode(b64_metadata, BEND(&metadata),
+                                                BCAP(&metadata));
+        if (decoded_len < 0)
+        {
+            msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: failed to base64 decode provided metadata");
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+        ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&metadata, decoded_len));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        int64_t timestamp = htonll((uint64_t)now);
+        ASSERT(buf_write(&metadata, &TLS_CRYPT_METADATA_TYPE_TIMESTAMP, 1));
+        ASSERT(buf_write(&metadata, &timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)));
+    }
+
+    tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(&server_key, true, server_key_file,
+                                 server_key_inline);
+    if (!tls_crypt_v2_wrap_client_key(&dst, &client_key, &metadata, &server_key,
+                                      &gc))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not wrap generated client key");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* PEM-encode Kc || WKc */
+    if (!crypto_pem_encode(tls_crypt_v2_cli_pem_name, &client_key_pem, &dst,
+                           &gc))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not PEM-encode client key");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    const char *client_file = filename;
+    bool client_inline = false;
+
+    if (!filename || streq(filename, ""))
+    {
+        printf("%.*s\n", BLEN(&client_key_pem), BPTR(&client_key_pem));
+        client_file = (const char *)BPTR(&client_key_pem);
+        client_inline = true;
+    }
+    else if (!buffer_write_file(filename, &client_key_pem))
+    {
+        msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not write client key file");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Sanity check: load client key (as "client") */
+    struct key_ctx_bi test_client_key;
+    struct buffer test_wrapped_client_key;
+    msg(D_GENKEY, "Testing client-side key loading...");
+    tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(&test_client_key, &test_wrapped_client_key,
+                                 client_file, client_inline);
+    free_key_ctx_bi(&test_client_key);
+
+    /* Sanity check: unwrap and load client key (as "server") */
+    struct buffer test_metadata = alloc_buf_gc(TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_METADATA_LEN,
+                                               &gc);
+    struct key2 test_client_key2 = { 0 };
+    free_key_ctx(&server_key);
+    tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(&server_key, false, server_key_file,
+                                 server_key_inline);
+    msg(D_GENKEY, "Testing server-side key loading...");
+    ASSERT(tls_crypt_v2_unwrap_client_key(&test_client_key2, &test_metadata,
+                                          test_wrapped_client_key, &server_key));
+    secure_memzero(&test_client_key2, sizeof(test_client_key2));
+    free_buf(&test_wrapped_client_key);
+
+cleanup:
+    secure_memzero(&client_key, sizeof(client_key));
+    free_key_ctx(&server_key);
+    buf_clear(&client_key_pem);
+    buf_clear(&dst);
+
+    gc_free(&gc);
+}