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-rw-r--r--contrib/vcpkg-ports/pkcs11-helper/pkcs11-helper-001-RFC7512.patch686
1 files changed, 686 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/vcpkg-ports/pkcs11-helper/pkcs11-helper-001-RFC7512.patch b/contrib/vcpkg-ports/pkcs11-helper/pkcs11-helper-001-RFC7512.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84fba08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/vcpkg-ports/pkcs11-helper/pkcs11-helper-001-RFC7512.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,686 @@
+commit 90590b02085edc3830bdfe0942a46c4e7bf3f1ab (HEAD -> master)
+Author: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 14:58:24 2015 +0100
+
+ Serialize to RFC7512-compliant PKCS#11 URIs
+
+ Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+
+commit 4d5280da8df591aab701dff4493d13a835a9b29c
+Author: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+Date: Wed Dec 10 14:00:21 2014 +0000
+
+ Accept RFC7512-compliant PKCS#11 URIs as serialized token/certificate IDs
+
+ The old format is still accepted for compatibility.
+
+ Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+
+commit 14e09211c3d50eb06825090c9765e4382cf52f19
+Author: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+Date: Sun Dec 14 19:42:18 2014 +0000
+
+ Stop _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary() checking for trailing NUL
+
+ We are going to want to use this for parsing %XX hex escapes in RFC7512
+ PKCS#11 URIs, where we cannot expect a trailing NUL. Since there's only
+ one existing caller at the moment, it's simple just to let the caller
+ have responsibility for that check.
+
+ Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+diff --git a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
+index ad275f8..1d077e4 100644
+--- a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
++++ b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
+@@ -61,29 +61,127 @@
+
+ #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11H_TOKEN) || defined(ENABLE_PKCS11H_CERTIFICATE)
+
++#define URI_SCHEME "pkcs11:"
++
++#define token_field_ofs(field) ((unsigned long)&(((struct pkcs11h_token_id_s *)0)->field))
++#define token_field_size(field) sizeof((((struct pkcs11h_token_id_s *)0)->field))
++#define token_field(name, field) { name "=", sizeof(name), \
++ token_field_ofs(field), token_field_size(field) }
++
++static struct {
++ const char const *name;
++ size_t namelen;
++ unsigned long field_ofs;
++ size_t field_size;
++} __token_fields[] = {
++ token_field ("model", model),
++ token_field ("token", label),
++ token_field ("manufacturer", manufacturerID ),
++ token_field ("serial", serialNumber ),
++ { NULL },
++};
++
++#define P11_URL_VERBATIM "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \
++ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \
++ "0123456789_-."
++
++static
++int
++__token_attr_escape(char *uri, char *attr, size_t attrlen)
++{
++ int len = 0, i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
++ if ((attr[i] != '\x0') && strchr(P11_URL_VERBATIM, attr[i])) {
++ if (uri) {
++ *(uri++) = attr[i];
++ }
++ len++;
++ } else {
++ if (uri) {
++ sprintf(uri, "%%%02x", (unsigned char)attr[i]);
++ uri += 3;
++ }
++ len += 3;
++ }
++ }
++ return len;
++}
++
++static
++CK_RV
++__generate_pkcs11_uri (
++ OUT char * const sz,
++ IN OUT size_t *max,
++ IN const pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id,
++ IN const pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id
++) {
++ size_t _max;
++ char *p = sz;
++ int i;
++
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (max!=NULL);
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (token_id!=NULL);
++
++ _max = strlen(URI_SCHEME);
++ for (i = 0; __token_fields[i].name; i++) {
++ char *field = ((char *)token_id) + __token_fields[i].field_ofs;
++
++ _max += __token_fields[i].namelen;
++ _max += __token_attr_escape (NULL, field, strlen(field));
++ _max++; /* For a semicolon or trailing NUL */
++ }
++ if (certificate_id) {
++ _max += strlen (";id=");
++ _max += __token_attr_escape (NULL,
++ (char *)certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
++ certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size);
++ }
++
++ if (!sz) {
++ *max = _max;
++ return CKR_OK;
++ }
++
++ if (sz && *max < _max)
++ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++
++ p += sprintf(p, URI_SCHEME);
++ for (i = 0; __token_fields[i].name; i++) {
++ char *field = ((char *)token_id) + __token_fields[i].field_ofs;
++
++ p += sprintf (p, "%s", __token_fields[i].name);
++ p += __token_attr_escape (p, field, strlen(field));
++ *(p++) = ';';
++ }
++ if (certificate_id) {
++ p += sprintf (p, "id=");
++ p += __token_attr_escape (p,
++ (char *)certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
++ certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size);
++ } else {
++ /* Remove the unneeded trailing semicolon */
++ p--;
++ }
++ *(p++) = 0;
++
++ *max = _max;
++
++ return CKR_OK;
++}
++
+ CK_RV
+ pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
+ OUT char * const sz,
+ IN OUT size_t *max,
+ IN const pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id
+ ) {
+- const char *sources[5];
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+- size_t n;
+- int e;
+
+ /*_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL); Not required*/
+ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (max!=NULL);
+ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (token_id!=NULL);
+
+- { /* Must be after assert */
+- sources[0] = token_id->manufacturerID;
+- sources[1] = token_id->model;
+- sources[2] = token_id->serialNumber;
+- sources[3] = token_id->label;
+- sources[4] = NULL;
+- }
+-
+ _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+ PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+ "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId entry sz=%p, *max="P_Z", token_id=%p",
+@@ -92,67 +190,161 @@ pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
+ (void *)token_id
+ );
+
+- n = 0;
+- for (e=0;sources[e] != NULL;e++) {
+- size_t t;
+- if (
+- (rv = _pkcs11h_util_escapeString (
+- NULL,
+- sources[e],
+- &t,
+- __PKCS11H_SERIALIZE_INVALID_CHARS
+- )) != CKR_OK
+- ) {
+- goto cleanup;
++ rv = __generate_pkcs11_uri(sz, max, NULL, token_id);
++
++ _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
++ PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
++ "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId return rv=%lu-'%s', *max="P_Z", sz='%s'",
++ rv,
++ pkcs11h_getMessage (rv),
++ *max,
++ sz
++ );
++
++ return rv;
++}
++
++static
++CK_RV
++__parse_token_uri_attr (
++ const char *uri,
++ size_t urilen,
++ char *tokstr,
++ size_t toklen,
++ size_t *parsed_len
++) {
++ size_t orig_toklen = toklen;
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++
++ while (urilen && toklen > 1) {
++ if (*uri == '%') {
++ size_t size = 1;
++
++ if (urilen < 3) {
++ rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ rv = _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary ((unsigned char *)tokstr,
++ uri + 1, &size);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ uri += 2;
++ urilen -= 2;
++ } else {
++ *tokstr = *uri;
+ }
+- n+=t;
++ tokstr++;
++ uri++;
++ toklen--;
++ urilen--;
++ tokstr[0] = 0;
+ }
+
+- if (sz != NULL) {
+- if (*max < n) {
+- rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+- goto cleanup;
++ if (urilen) {
++ rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++ } else if (parsed_len) {
++ *parsed_len = orig_toklen - toklen;
++ }
++
++ done:
++ return rv;
++}
++
++static
++CK_RV
++__parse_pkcs11_uri (
++ OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id,
++ OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id,
++ IN const char * const sz
++) {
++ const char *end, *p;
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (token_id!=NULL);
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
++
++ if (strncmp (sz, URI_SCHEME, strlen (URI_SCHEME)))
++ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++
++ end = sz + strlen (URI_SCHEME) - 1;
++ while (rv == CKR_OK && end[0] && end[1]) {
++ int i;
++
++ p = end + 1;
++ end = strchr (p, ';');
++ if (!end)
++ end = p + strlen(p);
++
++ for (i = 0; __token_fields[i].name; i++) {
++ /* Parse the token=, label=, manufacturer= and serial= fields */
++ if (!strncmp(p, __token_fields[i].name, __token_fields[i].namelen)) {
++ char *field = ((char *)token_id) + __token_fields[i].field_ofs;
++
++ p += __token_fields[i].namelen;
++ rv = __parse_token_uri_attr (p, end - p, field,
++ __token_fields[i].field_size,
++ NULL);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ goto matched;
++ }
+ }
++ if (certificate_id && !strncmp(p, "id=", 3)) {
++ p += 3;
++
++ rv = _pkcs11h_mem_malloc ((void *)&certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
++ end - p + 1);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
+
+- n = 0;
+- for (e=0;sources[e] != NULL;e++) {
+- size_t t = *max-n;
+- if (
+- (rv = _pkcs11h_util_escapeString (
+- sz+n,
+- sources[e],
+- &t,
+- __PKCS11H_SERIALIZE_INVALID_CHARS
+- )) != CKR_OK
+- ) {
++ rv = __parse_token_uri_attr (p, end - p,
++ (char *)certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
++ end - p + 1,
++ &certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+- n+=t;
+- sz[n-1] = '/';
++
++ goto matched;
+ }
+- sz[n-1] = '\x0';
+- }
+
+- *max = n;
+- rv = CKR_OK;
++ /* We don't parse object= because the match code doesn't support
++ matching by label. */
++
++ /* Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI element. */
++ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
++ matched:
++ ;
++ }
+ cleanup:
++ /* The matching code doesn't support support partial matches; it needs
++ * *all* of manufacturer, model, serial and label attributes to be
++ * defined. So reject partial URIs early instead of letting it do the
++ * wrong thing. We can maybe improve this later. */
++ if (!token_id->model[0] || !token_id->label[0] ||
++ !token_id->manufacturerID[0] || !token_id->serialNumber[0]) {
++ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++ }
+
+- _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+- PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+- "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId return rv=%lu-'%s', *max="P_Z", sz='%s'",
+- rv,
+- pkcs11h_getMessage (rv),
+- *max,
+- sz
+- );
++ /* For a certificate ID we need CKA_ID */
++ if (certificate_id && !certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size) {
++ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++ }
+
+ return rv;
+ }
+
++static
+ CK_RV
+-pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
+- OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t *p_token_id,
++__pkcs11h_token_legacy_deserializeTokenId (
++ OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id,
+ IN const char * const sz
+ ) {
+ #define __PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER 4
+@@ -161,24 +353,11 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
+ size_t s;
+ } targets[__PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER];
+
+- pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id = NULL;
+ char *p1 = NULL;
+ char *_sz = NULL;
+ int e;
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+
+- _PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_token_id!=NULL);
+- _PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
+-
+- _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+- PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+- "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId entry p_token_id=%p, sz='%s'",
+- (void *)p_token_id,
+- sz
+- );
+-
+- *p_token_id = NULL;
+-
+ if (
+ (rv = _pkcs11h_mem_strdup (
+ (void *)&_sz,
+@@ -190,10 +369,6 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
+
+ p1 = _sz;
+
+- if ((rv = _pkcs11h_token_newTokenId (&token_id)) != CKR_OK) {
+- goto cleanup;
+- }
+-
+ targets[0].p = token_id->manufacturerID;
+ targets[0].s = sizeof (token_id->manufacturerID);
+ targets[1].p = token_id->model;
+@@ -252,6 +427,51 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
+ p1 = p2+1;
+ }
+
++ rv = CKR_OK;
++
++cleanup:
++
++ if (_sz != NULL) {
++ _pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
++ }
++
++ return rv;
++#undef __PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER
++}
++
++CK_RV
++pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
++ OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t *p_token_id,
++ IN const char * const sz
++) {
++ pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id = NULL;
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
++
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_token_id!=NULL);
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
++
++ _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
++ PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
++ "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId entry p_token_id=%p, sz='%s'",
++ (void *)p_token_id,
++ sz
++ );
++
++ *p_token_id = NULL;
++
++ if ((rv = _pkcs11h_token_newTokenId (&token_id)) != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (!strncmp (sz, URI_SCHEME, strlen (URI_SCHEME))) {
++ rv = __parse_pkcs11_uri(token_id, NULL, sz);
++ } else {
++ rv = __pkcs11h_token_legacy_deserializeTokenId(token_id, sz);
++ }
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
+ strncpy (
+ token_id->display,
+ token_id->label,
+@@ -264,11 +484,6 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
+ rv = CKR_OK;
+
+ cleanup:
+-
+- if (_sz != NULL) {
+- _pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
+- }
+-
+ if (token_id != NULL) {
+ pkcs11h_token_freeTokenId (token_id);
+ }
+@@ -281,7 +496,6 @@ cleanup:
+ );
+
+ return rv;
+-#undef __PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER
+ }
+
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11H_TOKEN || ENABLE_PKCS11H_CERTIFICATE */
+@@ -295,9 +509,6 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId (
+ IN const pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id
+ ) {
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+- size_t saved_max = 0;
+- size_t n = 0;
+- size_t _max = 0;
+
+ /*_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL); Not required */
+ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (max!=NULL);
+@@ -311,42 +522,7 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId (
+ (void *)certificate_id
+ );
+
+- if (sz != NULL) {
+- saved_max = n = *max;
+- }
+- *max = 0;
+-
+- if (
+- (rv = pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
+- sz,
+- &n,
+- certificate_id->token_id
+- )) != CKR_OK
+- ) {
+- goto cleanup;
+- }
+-
+- _max = n + certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size*2 + 1;
+-
+- if (sz != NULL) {
+- if (saved_max < _max) {
+- rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+- goto cleanup;
+- }
+-
+- sz[n-1] = '/';
+- rv = _pkcs11h_util_binaryToHex (
+- sz+n,
+- saved_max-n,
+- certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
+- certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size
+- );
+- }
+-
+- *max = _max;
+- rv = CKR_OK;
+-
+-cleanup:
++ rv = __generate_pkcs11_uri(sz, max, certificate_id, certificate_id->token_id);
+
+ _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+ PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+@@ -360,27 +536,16 @@ cleanup:
+ return rv;
+ }
+
++static
+ CK_RV
+-pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
+- OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t * const p_certificate_id,
++__pkcs11h_certificate_legacy_deserializeCertificateId (
++ OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id,
+ IN const char * const sz
+ ) {
+- pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id = NULL;
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ char *p = NULL;
+ char *_sz = NULL;
+-
+- _PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_certificate_id!=NULL);
+- _PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
+-
+- *p_certificate_id = NULL;
+-
+- _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+- PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+- "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId entry p_certificate_id=%p, sz='%s'",
+- (void *)p_certificate_id,
+- sz
+- );
++ size_t id_hex_len;
+
+ if (
+ (rv = _pkcs11h_mem_strdup (
+@@ -393,10 +558,6 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
+
+ p = _sz;
+
+- if ((rv = _pkcs11h_certificate_newCertificateId (&certificate_id)) != CKR_OK) {
+- goto cleanup;
+- }
+-
+ if ((p = strrchr (_sz, '/')) == NULL) {
+ rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto cleanup;
+@@ -414,7 +575,12 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+- certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size = strlen (p)/2;
++ id_hex_len = strlen (p);
++ if (id_hex_len & 1) {
++ rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++ certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size = id_hex_len/2;
+
+ if (
+ (rv = _pkcs11h_mem_malloc (
+@@ -430,21 +596,64 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
++ rv = CKR_OK;
++
++cleanup:
++
++ if (_sz != NULL) {
++ _pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
++ }
++
++ return rv;
++
++}
++
++CK_RV
++pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
++ OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t * const p_certificate_id,
++ IN const char * const sz
++) {
++ pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id = NULL;
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
++
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_certificate_id!=NULL);
++ _PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
++
++ *p_certificate_id = NULL;
++
++ _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
++ PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
++ "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId entry p_certificate_id=%p, sz='%s'",
++ (void *)p_certificate_id,
++ sz
++ );
++
++ if ((rv = _pkcs11h_certificate_newCertificateId (&certificate_id)) != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++ if ((rv = _pkcs11h_token_newTokenId (&certificate_id->token_id)) != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (!strncmp(sz, URI_SCHEME, strlen (URI_SCHEME))) {
++ rv = __parse_pkcs11_uri (certificate_id->token_id, certificate_id, sz);
++ } else {
++ rv = __pkcs11h_certificate_legacy_deserializeCertificateId (certificate_id, sz);
++ }
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
+ *p_certificate_id = certificate_id;
+ certificate_id = NULL;
+ rv = CKR_OK;
+
+ cleanup:
+-
+ if (certificate_id != NULL) {
+ pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificateId (certificate_id);
+ certificate_id = NULL;
+ }
+
+- if (_sz != NULL) {
+- _pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
+- }
+-
+ _PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+ PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+ "PKCS#11: pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId return rv=%lu-'%s'",
+diff --git a/lib/pkcs11h-util.c b/lib/pkcs11h-util.c
+index 0743fd1..f90e443 100644
+--- a/lib/pkcs11h-util.c
++++ b/lib/pkcs11h-util.c
+@@ -110,12 +110,7 @@ _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary (
+ p++;
+ }
+
+- if (*p != '\x0') {
+- return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+- }
+- else {
+- return CKR_OK;
+- }
++ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ CK_RV
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-05-10 01:34:54 +0000