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Diffstat (limited to 'ssl.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl.h | 849 |
1 files changed, 849 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,849 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. <sales@openvpn.net> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_SSL_H +#define OPENVPN_SSL_H + +#if defined(USE_CRYPTO) && defined(USE_SSL) + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> + +#include "basic.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "session_id.h" +#include "reliable.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "plugin.h" + +/* + * OpenVPN Protocol, taken from ssl.h in OpenVPN source code. + * + * TCP/UDP Packet: This represents the top-level encapsulation. + * + * TCP/UDP packet format: + * + * Packet length (16 bits, unsigned) -- TCP only, always sent as + * plaintext. Since TCP is a stream protocol, the packet + * length words define the packetization of the stream. + * + * Packet opcode/key_id (8 bits) -- TLS only, not used in + * pre-shared secret mode. + * packet message type, a P_* constant (high 5 bits) + * key_id (low 3 bits, see key_id in struct tls_session + * below for comment). The key_id refers to an + * already negotiated TLS session. OpenVPN seamlessly + * renegotiates the TLS session by using a new key_id + * for the new session. Overlap (controlled by + * user definable parameters) between old and new TLS + * sessions is allowed, providing a seamless transition + * during tunnel operation. + * + * Payload (n bytes), which may be a P_CONTROL, P_ACK, or P_DATA + * message. + * + * Message types: + * + * P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 -- Key method 1, initial key from + * client, forget previous state. + * + * P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 -- Key method 2, initial key + * from server, forget previous state. + * + * P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 -- New key, with a graceful transition + * from old to new key in the sense that a transition window + * exists where both the old or new key_id can be used. OpenVPN + * uses two different forms of key_id. The first form is 64 bits + * and is used for all P_CONTROL messages. P_DATA messages on the + * other hand use a shortened key_id of 3 bits for efficiency + * reasons since the vast majority of OpenVPN packets in an + * active tunnel will be P_DATA messages. The 64 bit form + * is referred to as a session_id, while the 3 bit form is + * referred to as a key_id. + * + * P_CONTROL_V1 -- Control channel packet (usually TLS ciphertext). + * + * P_ACK_V1 -- Acknowledgement for P_CONTROL packets received. + * + * P_DATA_V1 -- Data channel packet containing actual tunnel data + * ciphertext. + * + * P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 -- Key method 2, initial key from + * client, forget previous state. + * + * P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 -- Key method 2, initial key from + * server, forget previous state. + * + * P_CONTROL* and P_ACK Payload: The P_CONTROL message type + * indicates a TLS ciphertext packet which has been encapsulated + * inside of a reliability layer. The reliability layer is + * implemented as a straightforward ACK and retransmit model. + * + * P_CONTROL message format: + * + * local session_id (random 64 bit value to identify TLS session). + * HMAC signature of entire encapsulation header for integrity + * check if --tls-auth is specified (usually 16 or 20 bytes). + * packet-id for replay protection (4 or 8 bytes, includes + * sequence number and optional time_t timestamp). + * P_ACK packet_id array length (1 byte). + * P_ACK packet-id array (if length > 0). + * P_ACK remote session_id (if length > 0). + * message packet-id (4 bytes). + * TLS payload ciphertext (n bytes) (only for P_CONTROL). + * + * Once the TLS session has been initialized and authenticated, + * the TLS channel is used to exchange random key material for + * bidirectional cipher and HMAC keys which will be + * used to secure actual tunnel packets. OpenVPN currently + * implements two key methods. Key method 1 directly + * derives keys using random bits obtained from the RAND_bytes + * OpenSSL function. Key method 2 mixes random key material + * from both sides of the connection using the TLS PRF mixing + * function. Key method 2 is the preferred method and is the default + * for OpenVPN 2.0. + * + * TLS plaintext content: + * + * TLS plaintext packet (if key_method == 1): + * + * Cipher key length in bytes (1 byte). + * Cipher key (n bytes). + * HMAC key length in bytes (1 byte). + * HMAC key (n bytes). + * Options string (n bytes, null terminated, client/server options + * string should match). + * + * TLS plaintext packet (if key_method == 2): + * + * Literal 0 (4 bytes). + * key_method type (1 byte). + * key_source structure (pre_master only defined for client -> + * server). + * options_string_length, including null (2 bytes). + * Options string (n bytes, null terminated, client/server options + * string must match). + * [The username/password data below is optional, record can end + * at this point.] + * username_string_length, including null (2 bytes). + * Username string (n bytes, null terminated). + * password_string_length, including null (2 bytes). + * Password string (n bytes, null terminated). + * + * The P_DATA payload represents encrypted, encapsulated tunnel + * packets which tend to be either IP packets or Ethernet frames. + * This is essentially the "payload" of the VPN. + * + * P_DATA message content: + * HMAC of ciphertext IV + ciphertext (if not disabled by + * --auth none). + * Ciphertext IV (size is cipher-dependent, if not disabled by + * --no-iv). + * Tunnel packet ciphertext. + * + * P_DATA plaintext + * packet_id (4 or 8 bytes, if not disabled by --no-replay). + * In SSL/TLS mode, 4 bytes are used because the implementation + * can force a TLS renegotation before 2^32 packets are sent. + * In pre-shared key mode, 8 bytes are used (sequence number + * and time_t value) to allow long-term key usage without + * packet_id collisions. + * User plaintext (n bytes). + * + * Notes: + * (1) ACK messages can be encoded in either the dedicated + * P_ACK record or they can be prepended to a P_CONTROL message. + * (2) P_DATA and P_CONTROL/P_ACK use independent packet-id + * sequences because P_DATA is an unreliable channel while + * P_CONTROL/P_ACK is a reliable channel. Each use their + * own independent HMAC keys. + * (3) Note that when --tls-auth is used, all message types are + * protected with an HMAC signature, even the initial packets + * of the TLS handshake. This makes it easy for OpenVPN to + * throw away bogus packets quickly, without wasting resources + * on attempting a TLS handshake which will ultimately fail. + */ + +/* Used in the TLS PRF function */ +#define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN" + +/* passwords */ +#define UP_TYPE_AUTH "Auth" +#define UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY "Private Key" + +/* packet opcode (high 5 bits) and key-id (low 3 bits) are combined in one byte */ +#define P_KEY_ID_MASK 0x07 +#define P_OPCODE_SHIFT 3 + +/* packet opcodes -- the V1 is intended to allow protocol changes in the future */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 1 /* initial key from client, forget previous state */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 2 /* initial key from server, forget previous state */ +#define P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 3 /* new key, graceful transition from old to new key */ +#define P_CONTROL_V1 4 /* control channel packet (usually TLS ciphertext) */ +#define P_ACK_V1 5 /* acknowledgement for packets received */ +#define P_DATA_V1 6 /* data channel packet */ + +/* indicates key_method >= 2 */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 7 /* initial key from client, forget previous state */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 8 /* initial key from server, forget previous state */ + +/* define the range of legal opcodes */ +#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 1 +#define P_LAST_OPCODE 8 + +/* key negotiation states */ +#define S_ERROR -1 +#define S_UNDEF 0 +#define S_INITIAL 1 /* tls_init() was called */ +#define S_PRE_START 2 /* waiting for initial reset & acknowledgement */ +#define S_START 3 /* ready to exchange keys */ +#define S_SENT_KEY 4 /* client does S_SENT_KEY -> S_GOT_KEY */ +#define S_GOT_KEY 5 /* server does S_GOT_KEY -> S_SENT_KEY */ +#define S_ACTIVE 6 /* ready to exchange data channel packets */ +#define S_NORMAL_OP 7 /* normal operations */ + +/* + * Are we ready to receive data channel packets? + * + * Also, if true, we can safely assume session has been + * authenticated by TLS. + * + * NOTE: Assumes S_SENT_KEY + 1 == S_GOT_KEY. + */ +#define DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks) ((ks)->state >= (S_GOT_KEY - (multi)->opt.server)) + +/* Should we aggregate TLS acknowledgements, and tack them onto control packets? */ +#define TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK + +/* + * If TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK, set the + * max number of acknowledgments that + * can "hitch a ride" on an outgoing + * non-P_ACK_V1 control packet. + */ +#define CONTROL_SEND_ACK_MAX 4 + +/* + * Define number of buffers for send and receive in the reliability layer. + */ +#define TLS_RELIABLE_N_SEND_BUFFERS 4 /* also window size for reliablity layer */ +#define TLS_RELIABLE_N_REC_BUFFERS 8 + +/* + * Various timeouts + */ + +#define TLS_MULTI_REFRESH 15 /* call tls_multi_process once every n seconds */ +#define TLS_MULTI_HORIZON 2 /* call tls_multi_process frequently for n seconds after + every packet sent/received action */ + +/* The SSL/TLS worker thread will wait at most this many seconds for the interprocess + communication pipe to the main thread to be ready to accept writes. */ +#define TLS_MULTI_THREAD_SEND_TIMEOUT 5 + +/* Interval that tls_multi_process should call tls_authentication_status */ +#define TLS_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_INTERVAL 10 + +/* + * Buffer sizes (also see mtu.h). + */ + +/* Maximum length of the username in cert */ +#define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64 + +/* Legal characters in an X509 or common name */ +#define X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_COLON|CC_SLASH|CC_EQUAL) +#define COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH) + +/* Maximum length of OCC options string passed as part of auth handshake */ +#define TLS_OPTIONS_LEN 512 + +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ +#define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN" + +/* + * Range of key exchange methods + */ +#define KEY_METHOD_MIN 1 +#define KEY_METHOD_MAX 2 + +/* key method taken from lower 4 bits */ +#define KEY_METHOD_MASK 0x0F + +/* + * Measure success rate of TLS handshakes, for debugging only + */ +/* #define MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS */ + +/* + * Keep track of certificate hashes at various depths + */ + +/* Maximum certificate depth we will allow */ +#define MAX_CERT_DEPTH 16 + +struct cert_hash { + unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; +}; + +struct cert_hash_set { + struct cert_hash *ch[MAX_CERT_DEPTH]; +}; + +/* + * Key material, used as source for PRF-based + * key expansion. + */ + +struct key_source { + uint8_t pre_master[48]; /* client generated */ + uint8_t random1[32]; /* generated by both client and server */ + uint8_t random2[32]; /* generated by both client and server */ +}; + +struct key_source2 { + struct key_source client; + struct key_source server; +}; + +/* + * Represents a single instantiation of a TLS negotiation and + * data channel key exchange. 4 keys are kept: encrypt hmac, + * decrypt hmac, encrypt cipher, and decrypt cipher. The TLS + * control channel is used to exchange these keys. + * Each hard or soft reset will build + * a fresh key_state. Normally an openvpn session will contain two + * key_state objects, one for the current TLS connection, and other + * for the retiring or "lame duck" key. The lame duck key_state is + * used to maintain transmission continuity on the data-channel while + * a key renegotiation is taking place. + */ +struct key_state +{ + int state; + int key_id; /* inherited from struct tls_session below */ + + SSL *ssl; /* SSL object -- new obj created for each new key */ + BIO *ssl_bio; /* read/write plaintext from here */ + BIO *ct_in; /* write ciphertext to here */ + BIO *ct_out; /* read ciphertext from here */ + + time_t established; /* when our state went S_ACTIVE */ + time_t must_negotiate; /* key negotiation times out if not finished before this time */ + time_t must_die; /* this object is destroyed at this time */ + + int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */ + struct session_id session_id_remote; /* peer's random session ID */ + struct link_socket_actual remote_addr; /* peer's IP addr */ + struct packet_id packet_id; /* for data channel, to prevent replay attacks */ + + struct key_ctx_bi key; /* data channel keys for encrypt/decrypt/hmac */ + + struct key_source2 *key_src; /* source entropy for key expansion */ + + struct buffer plaintext_read_buf; + struct buffer plaintext_write_buf; + struct buffer ack_write_buf; + + struct reliable *send_reliable; /* holds a copy of outgoing packets until ACK received */ + struct reliable *rec_reliable; /* order incoming ciphertext packets before we pass to TLS */ + struct reliable_ack *rec_ack; /* buffers all packet IDs we want to ACK back to sender */ + + struct buffer_list *paybuf; + + counter_type n_bytes; /* how many bytes sent/recvd since last key exchange */ + counter_type n_packets; /* how many packets sent/recvd since last key exchange */ + + /* + * If bad username/password, TLS connection will come up but 'authenticated' will be false. + */ + bool authenticated; + time_t auth_deferred_expire; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + /* If auth_deferred is true, authentication is being deferred */ + bool auth_deferred; +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + unsigned int mda_key_id; + unsigned int mda_status; +#endif +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + unsigned int auth_control_status; + time_t acf_last_mod; + char *auth_control_file; +#endif +#endif +}; + +/* + * Our const options, obtained directly or derived from + * command line options. + */ +struct tls_options +{ + /* our master SSL_CTX from which all SSL objects derived */ + SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; + + /* data channel cipher, hmac, and key lengths */ + struct key_type key_type; + + /* true if we are a TLS server, client otherwise */ + bool server; + + /* if true, don't xmit until first packet from peer is received */ + bool xmit_hold; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* local and remote options strings + that must match between client and server */ + const char *local_options; + const char *remote_options; +#endif + + /* from command line */ + int key_method; + bool replay; + bool single_session; +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + bool disable_occ; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + bool push_peer_info; +#endif + int transition_window; + int handshake_window; + interval_t packet_timeout; + int renegotiate_bytes; + int renegotiate_packets; + interval_t renegotiate_seconds; + + /* cert verification parms */ + const char *verify_command; + const char *verify_export_cert; + const char *verify_x509name; + const char *crl_file; + int ns_cert_type; + unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS]; + const char *remote_cert_eku; + + /* allow openvpn config info to be + passed over control channel */ + bool pass_config_info; + + /* struct crypto_option flags */ + unsigned int crypto_flags_and; + unsigned int crypto_flags_or; + + int replay_window; /* --replay-window parm */ + int replay_time; /* --replay-window parm */ + + /* packet authentication for TLS handshake */ + struct crypto_options tls_auth; + struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key; + + /* frame parameters for TLS control channel */ + struct frame frame; + + /* used for username/password authentication */ + const char *auth_user_pass_verify_script; + bool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file; + const char *tmp_dir; + + /* use the client-config-dir as a positive authenticator */ + const char *client_config_dir_exclusive; + + /* instance-wide environment variable set */ + struct env_set *es; + const struct plugin_list *plugins; + + /* configuration file boolean options */ +# define SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED (1<<0) +# define SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME (1<<1) +# define SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL (1<<2) +# define SSLF_NO_NAME_REMAPPING (1<<3) +# define SSLF_OPT_VERIFY (1<<4) + unsigned int ssl_flags; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + struct man_def_auth_context *mda_context; +#endif + + /* --gremlin bits */ + int gremlin; +}; + +/* index into tls_session.key */ +#define KS_PRIMARY 0 /* the primary key */ +#define KS_LAME_DUCK 1 /* the key that's going to retire soon */ +#define KS_SIZE 2 + +/* + * A tls_session lives through multiple key_state life-cycles. Soft resets + * will reuse a tls_session object, but hard resets or errors will require + * that a fresh object be built. Normally three tls_session objects are maintained + * by an active openvpn session. The first is the current, TLS authenticated + * session, the second is used to process connection requests from a new + * client that would usurp the current session if successfully authenticated, + * and the third is used as a repository for a "lame-duck" key in the event + * that the primary session resets due to error while the lame-duck key still + * has time left before its expiration. Lame duck keys are used to maintain + * the continuity of the data channel connection while a new key is being + * negotiated. + */ +struct tls_session +{ + /* const options and config info */ + const struct tls_options *opt; + + /* during hard reset used to control burst retransmit */ + bool burst; + + /* authenticate control packets */ + struct crypto_options tls_auth; + struct packet_id tls_auth_pid; + + int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */ + struct session_id session_id; /* our random session ID */ + int key_id; /* increments with each soft reset (for key renegotiation) */ + + int limit_next; /* used for traffic shaping on the control channel */ + + int verify_maxlevel; + + char *common_name; + + struct cert_hash_set *cert_hash_set; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + uint32_t common_name_hashval; +#endif + + bool verified; /* true if peer certificate was verified against CA */ + + /* not-yet-authenticated incoming client */ + struct link_socket_actual untrusted_addr; + + struct key_state key[KS_SIZE]; +}; + +/* index into tls_multi.session */ +#define TM_ACTIVE 0 +#define TM_UNTRUSTED 1 +#define TM_LAME_DUCK 2 +#define TM_SIZE 3 + +/* + * The number of keys we will scan on encrypt or decrypt. The first + * is the "active" key. The second is the lame_duck or retiring key + * associated with the active key's session ID. The third is a detached + * lame duck session that only occurs in situations where a key renegotiate + * failed on the active key, but a lame duck key was still valid. By + * preserving the lame duck session, we can be assured of having a data + * channel key available even when network conditions are so bad that + * we can't negotiate a new key within the time allotted. + */ +#define KEY_SCAN_SIZE 3 + +/* + * An openvpn session running with TLS enabled has one tls_multi object. + */ +struct tls_multi +{ + /* const options and config info */ + struct tls_options opt; + + /* + * A list of key_state objects in the order they should be + * scanned by data channel encrypt and decrypt routines. + */ + struct key_state* key_scan[KEY_SCAN_SIZE]; + + /* + * used by tls_pre_encrypt to communicate the encrypt key + * to tls_post_encrypt() + */ + struct key_state *save_ks; /* temporary pointer used between pre/post routines */ + + /* + * Used to return outgoing address from + * tls_multi_process. + */ + struct link_socket_actual to_link_addr; + + /* + * Number of sessions negotiated thus far. + */ + int n_sessions; + + /* + * Number of errors. + */ + int n_hard_errors; /* errors due to TLS negotiation failure */ + int n_soft_errors; /* errors due to unrecognized or failed-to-authenticate incoming packets */ + + /* + * Our locked common name, username, and cert hashes (cannot change during the life of this tls_multi object) + */ + char *locked_cn; + char *locked_username; + struct cert_hash_set *locked_cert_hash_set; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + /* + * An error message to send to client on AUTH_FAILED + */ + char *client_reason; + + /* + * A multi-line string of general-purpose info received from peer + * over control channel. + */ + char *peer_info; + + /* Time of last call to tls_authentication_status */ + time_t tas_last; +#endif + + /* + * Our session objects. + */ + struct tls_session session[TM_SIZE]; +}; + +/* + * Used in --mode server mode to check tls-auth signature on initial + * packets received from new clients. + */ +struct tls_auth_standalone +{ + struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key; + struct crypto_options tls_auth_options; + struct frame frame; +}; + +void init_ssl_lib (void); +void free_ssl_lib (void); + +/* Build master SSL_CTX object that serves for the whole of openvpn instantiation */ +SSL_CTX *init_ssl (const struct options *options); + +struct tls_multi *tls_multi_init (struct tls_options *tls_options); + +struct tls_auth_standalone *tls_auth_standalone_init (struct tls_options *tls_options, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +void tls_auth_standalone_finalize (struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, + const struct frame *frame); + +void tls_multi_init_finalize(struct tls_multi *multi, + const struct frame *frame); + +void tls_multi_init_set_options(struct tls_multi* multi, + const char *local, + const char *remote); + +#define TLSMP_INACTIVE 0 +#define TLSMP_ACTIVE 1 +#define TLSMP_KILL 2 +int tls_multi_process (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *to_link, + struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr, + struct link_socket_info *to_link_socket_info, + interval_t *wakeup); + +void tls_multi_free (struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear); + +bool tls_pre_decrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, + const struct link_socket_actual *from, + struct buffer *buf, + struct crypto_options *opt); + +bool tls_pre_decrypt_lite (const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, + const struct link_socket_actual *from, + const struct buffer *buf); + +void tls_pre_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *buf, struct crypto_options *opt); + +void tls_post_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, struct buffer *buf); + +void show_available_tls_ciphers (void); +void get_highest_preference_tls_cipher (char *buf, int size); + +void pem_password_setup (const char *auth_file); +int pem_password_callback (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u); +void auth_user_pass_setup (const char *auth_file); +void ssl_set_auth_nocache (void); +void ssl_purge_auth (void); + + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR +/* + * ssl_get_auth_challenge will parse the server-pushed auth-failed + * reason string and return a dynamically allocated + * auth_challenge_info struct. + */ +void ssl_purge_auth_challenge (void); +void ssl_put_auth_challenge (const char *cr_str); +#endif + +void tls_set_verify_command (const char *cmd); +void tls_set_crl_verify (const char *crl); +void tls_set_verify_x509name (const char *x509name); + +void tls_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame); + +bool tls_send_payload (struct tls_multi *multi, + const uint8_t *data, + int size); + +bool tls_rec_payload (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *buf); + +const char *tls_common_name (const struct tls_multi* multi, const bool null); +void tls_set_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *common_name); +void tls_lock_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi); +void tls_lock_cert_hash_set (struct tls_multi *multi); + +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0 +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1 +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_DEFERRED 2 +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_UNDEFINED 3 +int tls_authentication_status (struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency); +void tls_deauthenticate (struct tls_multi *multi); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +bool tls_authenticate_key (struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, const bool auth, const char *client_reason); + +static inline char * +tls_get_peer_info(const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + return multi->peer_info; +} +#endif + +/* + * inline functions + */ + +static inline bool +tls_initial_packet_received (const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + return multi->n_sessions > 0; +} + +static inline bool +tls_test_auth_deferred_interval (const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + { + const struct key_state *ks = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY]; + return now < ks->auth_deferred_expire; + } + return false; +} + +static inline int +tls_test_payload_len (const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + { + const struct key_state *ks = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY]; + if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE) + return BLEN (&ks->plaintext_read_buf); + } + return 0; +} + +static inline void +tls_set_single_session (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + multi->opt.single_session = true; +} + +static inline const char * +tls_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + return multi->client_reason; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + +static inline bool +tls_common_name_hash (const struct tls_multi *multi, const char **cn, uint32_t *cn_hash) +{ + if (multi) + { + const struct tls_session *s = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; + if (s->common_name && s->common_name[0] != '\0') + { + *cn = s->common_name; + *cn_hash = s->common_name_hashval; + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +#endif + +/* + * protocol_dump() flags + */ +#define PD_TLS_AUTH_HMAC_SIZE_MASK 0xFF +#define PD_SHOW_DATA (1<<8) +#define PD_TLS (1<<9) +#define PD_VERBOSE (1<<10) + +const char *protocol_dump (struct buffer *buffer, + unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * debugging code + */ + +#ifdef MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS +void show_tls_performance_stats(void); +#endif + +/*#define EXTRACT_X509_FIELD_TEST*/ +void extract_x509_field_test (void); + +#endif /* USE_CRYPTO && USE_SSL */ + +#endif |