From f2b3dda12a731c2e0971cb7889728edaf23f6cb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=B6rg=20Frings-F=C3=BCrst?= Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 20:46:00 +0100 Subject: New upstream version 2.5.4 --- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/openvpn/ssl.c') diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c index d7494c2..d66299f 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ * packet encryption, packet authentication, and * packet compression. * - * Copyright (C) 2002-2018 OpenVPN Inc - * Copyright (C) 2010-2018 Fox Crypto B.V. - * Copyright (C) 2008-2013 David Sommerseth + * Copyright (C) 2002-2021 OpenVPN Inc + * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Fox Crypto B.V. + * Copyright (C) 2008-2021 David Sommerseth * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 @@ -445,6 +445,12 @@ ssl_set_auth_token(const char *token) set_auth_token(&auth_user_pass, &auth_token, token); } +void +ssl_set_auth_token_user(const char *username) +{ + set_auth_token_user(&auth_token, username); +} + /* * Cleans an auth token and checks if it was active */ @@ -558,7 +564,15 @@ tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, const char *crl_file, } else if (platform_stat(crl_file, &crl_stat) < 0) { - msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: Failed to stat CRL file, not (re)loading CRL."); + /* If crl_last_mtime is zero, the CRL file has not been read before. */ + if (ssl_ctx->crl_last_mtime == 0) + { + msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: Failed to stat CRL file during initialization, exiting."); + } + else + { + msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: Failed to stat CRL file, not reloading CRL."); + } return; } @@ -583,7 +597,7 @@ tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, const char *crl_file, * All files are in PEM format. */ void -init_ssl(const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx) +init_ssl(const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx, bool in_chroot) { ASSERT(NULL != new_ctx); @@ -701,7 +715,24 @@ init_ssl(const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx) /* Read CRL */ if (options->crl_file && !(options->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR)) { - tls_ctx_reload_crl(new_ctx, options->crl_file, options->crl_file_inline); + /* If we're running with the chroot option, we may run init_ssl() before + * and after chroot-ing. We can use the crl_file path as-is if we're + * not going to chroot, or if we already are inside the chroot. + * + * If we're going to chroot later, we need to prefix the path of the + * chroot directory to crl_file. + */ + if (!options->chroot_dir || in_chroot || options->crl_file_inline) + { + tls_ctx_reload_crl(new_ctx, options->crl_file, options->crl_file_inline); + } + else + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + struct buffer crl_file_buf = prepend_dir(options->chroot_dir, options->crl_file, &gc); + tls_ctx_reload_crl(new_ctx, BSTR(&crl_file_buf), options->crl_file_inline); + gc_free(&gc); + } } /* Once keys and cert are loaded, load ECDH parameters */ @@ -2295,7 +2326,8 @@ error: * to the TLS control channel (cleartext). */ static bool -key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) +key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, + struct tls_session *session) { struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ @@ -2327,8 +2359,8 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) } } - /* write username/password if specified */ - if (auth_user_pass_enabled) + /* write username/password if specified or we are using a auth-token */ + if (auth_user_pass_enabled || (auth_token.token_defined && auth_token.defined)) { #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT auth_user_pass_setup(session->opt->auth_user_pass_file, session->opt->sci); @@ -2341,7 +2373,7 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) * If we have a valid auth-token, send that instead of real * username/password */ - if (auth_token.defined) + if (auth_token.token_defined && auth_token.defined) { up = &auth_token; } @@ -2386,12 +2418,17 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) goto error; } - /* Generate tunnel keys if we're a TLS server. - * If we're a p2mp server and IV_NCP >= 2 is negotiated, the first key - * generation is postponed until after the pull/push, so we can process pushed - * cipher directives. + /* + * Generate tunnel keys if we're a TLS server. + * + * If we're a p2mp server to allow NCP, the first key + * generation is postponed until after the connect script finished and the + * NCP options can be processed. Since that always happens at after connect + * script options are available the CAS_SUCCEEDED status is identical to + * NCP options are processed and we have no extra state for NCP finished. */ - if (session->opt->server && !(session->opt->mode == MODE_SERVER && ks->key_id <= 0)) + if (session->opt->server && (session->opt->mode != MODE_SERVER + || multi->multi_state == CAS_SUCCEEDED)) { if (ks->authenticated > KS_AUTH_FALSE) { @@ -2847,7 +2884,7 @@ tls_process(struct tls_multi *multi, if (!buf->len && ((ks->state == S_START && !session->opt->server) || (ks->state == S_GOT_KEY && session->opt->server))) { - if (!key_method_2_write(buf, session)) + if (!key_method_2_write(buf, multi, session)) { goto error; } -- cgit v1.2.3